

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 USBERL 02274 01 OF 03 261304Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/075 W
				-----236510 261335Z /40			

O 261254Z JUN 87
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0627
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMCONSUL STUTTGART
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USBERLIN 02274

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR, BZ
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET RESPONSE IN BERLIN TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S SPEECH

1. SUMMARY: IN BERLIN, THE SOVIET REACTION TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S VISIT HAS BEEN MIXED. ON THE ONE HAND, THE
SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF UNUSUAL STEPS TO COMPLAIN
TO AND TO REMIND THE ALLIES OF THEIR DISPLEASURE ON
SEVERAL RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUES, MOSTLY INVOLVING AIR
MATTERS. THESE SOVIET ACTIONS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED
MORE TO STAKE OUT THE SOVIET POSITION AND TO REMIND THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02274 01 OF 03 261304Z

ALLIES THAT THE SOVIET VIEW CANNOT BE IGNORED, RATHER
THAN TO DISRUPT THE PRESENT FOUR-POWER RELATIONSHIP.
THESE SOVIET ACTIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY
PREDICTABLY CRITICAL PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM J GEHRON
DATE/CASE ID: 22 DEC 2004 200403871

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

SPEECH FROM SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS AND WEST
BERLIN'S ONE PRO-SOVIET NEWSPAPER.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING HIS INITIAL COURTESY CALL
ON THE AMERICAN MINISTER, SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER
MAKSIMYCHEV WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WAS INDICATIVE OF A GENUINE USG DESIRE
TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS IN BERLIN'S SITUATION. THESE
PRIVATE COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT
PREPARED TO RUSH INTO CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS, BUT MAY BE
WILLING TO FOCUS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS TO LOOK FOR
AREAS FOR MUTUAL, PRAGMATIC COOPERATION. END SUMMARY.

THE OFFICIAL SOVIET LINE IN BERLIN

3. THE INITIAL SOVIET REACTION IN BERLIN TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S VISIT WAS LARGELY ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES. IN
PUBLIC AND SEMI-FORMAL DISCUSSIONS, SOVIET AND EAST
EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS CAREFULLY ECHOED THE TASS COMMENTARY
AND WERE UNIFORMLY CRITICAL. THE COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER IN
WEST BERLIN, "DIE WAHRHEIT" (WHICH IS FINANCIALLY
SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE EAST GERMANS), DID
NOT BOTHER TO PRINT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, BUT DID
REPRINT THE TASS COMMENTARY ALONG WITH OTHER CRITICAL
REMARKS FROM SOVIET, EAST GERMAN AND POLISH SOURCES.
MOST OF THE NEWSPAPER'S COVERAGE OF THE VISIT FOCUSSED ON
THE ACCOMPANYING DEMONSTRATIONS AND CHARGES OF POLICE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 02274 01 OF 03 261304Z

BRUTALITY. THE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY DENOUNCED THE CALL
ON VON WEIZSAECKER AND THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT FOR CLOSER
TIES BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE WESTERN SECTORS OF THE CITY
AS A VIOLATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.

UNUSUAL SOVIET MOVES ON MINOR ISSUES

4. EQUALLY NEGATIVE WAS THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE ON
PRACTICAL BERLIN ISSUES, THOUGH THIS RESPONSE WAS
CONFINED TO RELATIVELY MINOR QUESTIONS. SOVIET ACTIONS
IN THIS REGARD WERE NOT DIRECTED SOLELY AT THE USG, BUT
SEEMED AIMED AT ALL THREE WESTERN ALLIES. IN AN UNUSUAL
MOVE, THE SOVIET EMBASSY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THE FACT THAT

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

IT HAD GIVEN A PROTEST TO THE THREE ALLIES ON THE LATE MAY MEETING OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN WEST BERLIN (SEPTEL). FOR THE FIRST TIME AT LEAST SINCE 1975, THE SOVIETS COMPLAINED IN A NON-PAPER TO THE US MISSION ABOUT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CIRCLING OVER EAST BERLIN DURING TEMPELHOF'S ANNUAL "OPEN HOUSE" EXHIBITION. (AS NOTED IN SEPTEL, THE SAME COMPLAINT WAS ALSO MADE IN THE BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER.)

THE BEETHOVEN BALLOON AND THE CONCORDE

5. SIMILARLY UNUSUAL WAS AN URGENT DEMARCHE BY MAKSIMYCHEV TO THE BRITISH OVER THE INTENTION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHER MALCOLM FORBES TO FLY A TETHERED GIANT BALLOON IN THE LIKENESS OF BEETHOVEN AT THE PLATZ DER REPUBLIK (IN FRONT OF THE REICHSTAG AND NEAR THE WALL) ON JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 02274 02 OF 03 261306Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/075 W
-----236561 261336Z /40							

O 261254Z JUN 87
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0628
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBERLIN

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMCONSUL STUTTGART
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USBERLIN 02274

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR, BZ
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET RESPONSE IN BERLIN TO PRESIDENT

18. THE PROTEST WAS MADE TO THE BRITISH BECAUSE THE BALLOON WAS TO FLY IN THE BRITISH SECTOR. THE SOVIETS ALSO DISCUSSED THE ISSUE IN MEETINGS WITH THE FRENCH (ALLIED CHAIRMAN) AND THE AMERICAN MINISTER AND REQUESTED A SPECIAL MEETING OF ALL FOUR CHIEF CONTROLLERS IN THE BASC (SEPTELS). IN THE PAST SUCH BALLOONS HAD BEEN ALLOWED IN BERLIN BY THE WESTERN ALLIES WITHOUT SOVIET COMPLAINT. BAD WEATHER FORCED A POSTPONEMENT, THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02274 02 OF 03 261306Z

TETHERED FORBES BALLOON WENT UP BRIEFLY AT THE PLATZ DER REPUBLIK ON JUNE 20.

-

6. IN ANOTHER UNUSUAL MOVE, THE FRENCH WERE INFORMED BY THE SOVIET CHIEF CONTROLLER IN THE BASC CIRCA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE FLIGHT TIME THAT THE SOVIETS SUDDENLY OPPOSED THE PLANNED USE BY A BERLIN-BOUND AIR FRANCE CONCORDE ON JUNE 20 OF A HIGHER-THAN-NORMAL CORRIDOR ALTITUDE (SEPTEL). THE SOVIETS HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY RAISED ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN AND AS LATE AS JUNE 17 HAD INDICATED TO THE FRENCH THAT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE JUNE 20 FLIGHT. THE CONCORDE FLEW INTO BERLIN WITHIN THE NORMAL "OPERATIONAL CEILING".

PRIVATE SOVIET REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

7. IN HIS JUNE 22 COURTESY CALL ON THE AMERICAN

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

MINISTER, SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER MAKSIMYCHEV TOOK A DIFFERENT TACK. MAKSIMYCHEV, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR GRININ, INITIATED DISCUSSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH BY SAYING THAT HE HAD HEARD SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WAS MEANT TO BE "CONSTRUCTIVE." WHILE NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO APPLAUD PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LANGUAGE ABOUT THE WALL, MAKSIMYCHEV INDICATED HE WAS PREPARED TO BE SHOWN THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH REFLECTED A USG DESIRE FOR EXPANDED COOPERATION IN BERLIN.

8. MINISTER KORNBLUM RESPONDED THAT THE USG DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ALTER THEIR VIEWS ON BERLIN STATUS, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO COULD NOT EXPECT THAT THE USG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 02274 02 OF 03 261306Z

VIEW WOULD CHANGE. IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISING NOR SHOULD THEY HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR CONFRONTATION. THE USG WAS INTERESTED IN PRAGMATIC IMPROVEMENTS IN BERLIN'S SITUATION. MINISTER KORNBLUM SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SHOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY BY THE SOVIETS AS EVIDENCE OF USG DESIRE AND INTENT.

-

9. MAKSIMYCHEV SEEMED TO TAKE THIS POINT. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ALWAYS WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS AND DID NOT DESIRE CONFRONTATION. HE ALLOWED, WITH REGARD TO THE BEETHOVEN BALLOON ISSUE, THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE OVERLY SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF RECENT EVENTS NEAR THE PLATZ DER REPUBLIK (MEANING THE DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE EAST BERLIN POPULACE) AND THAT "MISUNDERSTANDINGS" MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOVIET DEMARCHE. RETURNING TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, MAKSIMYCHEV ASKED IF THERE WERE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR THE SOVIETS TO CONSIDER AND IN WHAT TIME FRAME.

10. MINISTER KORNBLUM STATED THAT THE USG WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE ITEMS PUT FORWARD BY THE PRESIDENT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE AIR REGIME. MAKSIMYCHEV STATED THAT ANY CHANGES WOULD NEED A CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH MAKSIMYCHEV, IN VERY RELAXED FASHION, AGREEING TO LOOK AT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AGAIN WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE BERLIN PROPOSALS.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01	/075 W
				-----236662 261336Z /44			

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR, BZ

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET RESPONSE IN BERLIN TO PRESIDENT

11. COMMENT: RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS IN BERLIN REFLECT SOVIET ANNOYANCE OVER THE VISITS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, QUEEN ELIZABETH, AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND (PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE CALLS ON VON WEIZSAECKER). AT THE SAME TIME, AS INDICATED BY MAKSIMYCHEV'S EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY THE BALLOON ISSUE AFTER THE SOVIETS HAD FIRST BUILT IT UP, THESE ACTIONS SUGGEST MORE A DESIRE TO STAKE OUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02274 03 OF 03 261309Z

SOVIET POSITION AND TO REMIND THE ALLIES THAT SOVIET WISHES CANNOT BE IGNORED, RATHER THAN AN INTENT TO CREATE AN ALLIED-SOVIET CONFRONTATION OVER BERLIN ISSUES.

-

12. MISSION NOTES THAT EACH ALLY RECEIVED A COMPLAINT ABOUT A SPECIAL EVENT (THE TCA OPEN HOUSE, THE CONCORDE, THE BALLOON) THAT IS NOT A REGULAR PART OF THE AIR REGIME AND THAT NONE OF THE SOVIET COMPLAINTS ACTUALLY CAUSED CANCELLATION OF THE SPECIAL EVENT IN QUESTION. THE TIMING OF THE COMPLAINTS IN THE CONCORDE AND BALLOON CASES DID FORCE THE ALLIES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOVIET WISHES, BUT THE BASIC, NORMAL OPERATION OF THE AIR REGIME WAS NOT THREATENED. NONE OF THE OTHER SOVIET ACTIONS CURRENT A CHALLENGE TO THE PRESENT MODUS VIVENDI IN BERLIN EITHER.

13. THUS, MISSION IS INCLINED TO REGARD MAKSIMYCHEV'S COMMENTS ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH AS REFLECTING THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET REACTION. MAKSIMYCHEV CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE USG WAS NOT ABOUT TO CHANGE ITS "PRINCIPLED POSITION," BUT THIS DID NOT RULE OUT TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS TO TRY TO ACHIEVE PRAGMATIC MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL IMPROVEMENTS. MAKSIMYCHEV ALSO FELT THAT HE NEEDED TO MAKE THE SAME POINT WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE: NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET "PRINCIPLED POSITION," BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PRAGMATIC COOPERATION. ONCE MAKSIMYCHEV FELT WE UNDERSTOOD THIS SOVIET POSITION, HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE INTENT OF WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID.

14. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KORNBLUM

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL